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HOW CALIFORNIA GOVERNS THE NEWS MEDIA 
Jon H. Sylvester* 
While California legislation is generally regarded as progres-
sive, it is not immediately clear what "progressive" means when such 
democratic values as the right to information and the right to privacy 
conflict. This article surveys how certain state laws impact the oper-
ations of the print and broadcast news media. 
On the national scene, controversies such as the highly-publi-
cized defamation suits of General William Westmoreland and for-
mer Israel Defense Minister Ariel Sharon have prompted debate, 
discussion and analysis which have focused, inevitably, on the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution. Most legal battles in-
volving the press, however, achieve neither national publicity nor 
constitutional proportions. Although state laws affecting the news 
media must, when challenged, meet the requirements of the first 
amendment, it remains a practical reality that state laws govern a 
wide range of day-to-day media operations. 
Laws affecting the media include a number of traditional sub-
ject areas, including constitutional law, torts, evidence, and civil, 
criminal and administrative procedure. The topics discussed herein 
are defamation, invasion of privacy, cameras in the courtroom, shield 
law (or "reporter's privilege"), publication of recorded conversations 
and pilfered documents, and legislation regarding open meetings and 
open records. 
I. DEFAMATION 
California has several legislative provisions that concern defa-
mation (or, more specifically, slander and libel), as well as several 
provisions that directly concern newspapers, radio and television. 1 
State policy dictates that the media be afforded its constitutional 
right to inform the public of controversies surrounding sensitive is-
e \ 986 by Jon H. Sylvester 
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sues of public interest.2 
California allows media members a qualified privilege pursuant 
to law first enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan.s When a 
public official brings an action for defamation against a media de-
fendant, he must allege and prove that the publication was made 
with "actual malice.'" Actual malice is defined as "knowledge that 
[the publication] was false or ... reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not."11 The term "public official" was defined in New 
York Times, and was later expanded to include "public figures" in 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.s 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the court recognized two classi-
fications of public figures: 1) "persons who occupy positions of such 
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures 
for all purposes,"7 or who by reason of their fame, shape events in 
areas of concern to society at largej8 and 2) persons who "have thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order 
to influence the resolution of issues involved."9 
In California, courts have interpreted the definition of public 
figure, as defined in Gertz, to further require that "the [complainant] 
must have voluntarily and actively sought, in connection with any 
given matter of public interest, to influence the resolution of the is-
sues involved,"lo and his position "must be one which would invite 
public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it entirely apart 
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges 
in controversy."ll The latter requirement is termed the "public con-
troversy test."12 Thus, members of the California media must cope 
with a more restrictive definition of "public figure" than that of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
California courts have, however, endorsed the basic standard 
2. Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148-49, 162 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714-15 
(\980). 
3. 376 U.S. 254 (\966). 
4. [d. at 280. 
5. Id. See also Fisher v. Larson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 627,634, 188 Cal. Rptr. 216, 222 
(\982); Weingarten, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 133, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 705. 
6. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
8. Id. at 345 (1974) (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967». 
9. 418 U.S. at 345. 
10. Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 927, 
159 Cal. Rptr. 131,140 (1979). 
11. Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App. 3d 
646, 658-59, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 355 (1980). 
12. [d. at 660, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 356. 
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enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan. Under California law, a 
public figure or official in a civil defamation action against a news-
paper must show clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly 
libelous publication was published with knowledge that it was false 
or with a reckless disregard for the truth. IS 
Generally, all who take a responsible part in a publication are 
liable for any defamation that results from the publication.14 But the 
mere fact that oral defamation is subsequently quoted or printed in a 
newspaper does not render it libelous.lII One may not be held liable 
for republication of a statement unless the original statement is 
found to be defamatory. IS In Osmond v. EWAP, Inc.,17 the court 
refused to impose liability for the mere dissemination of libelous ma-
terial published by another on a showing that there was no reason to 
believe that the publication was libelous. In Osmond, the manager 
of a newspaper had no knowledge of the preparation or content of 
the article he published which contained the libelous matter, and he 
did not control the editorial staff. IS Liability is imposed upon one 
who delivers or transmits defamatory material published by another 
only "if he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory charac-
ter."19 This rule protects vendors of books, magazines and 
newspapers.20 
A. Statutory Defamation Provisions Relating to the Media 
Both California's criminal and civil codes contain statutory pro-
visions that specifically cover the media.21 Under the civil provisions, 
a person who alleges libel by a newspaper or slander by a radio 
broadcast may recover only special damages. Special damages are 
those that the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered with 
respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, in-
cluding such amounts as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has ex-
13. Belli v. Curtiss Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 396, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 133 
(1972). 
14. Osmond v. EWAP, Inc., 153 Cal. App. 3d 842, 852, 200 Cal. Rptr. 674, 679 
(1984). 
15. Mercado v. Hoener, 190 Cal. App. 2d 12, 13, 11 Cal. Rptr. 787, 791 (1961) (citing 
Oberkoller v. Woolman, 187 Cal. 500, 505 (1921)). 
16. Montandon v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 932, 935, 120 Cal. Rptr. 
196, 197 (1975). 
17. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 680. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 853, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 680. 
20. Id. 
21. CAL CIV. CODE §§ 45, 47, 48, 3425.1 (West 1982). 
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pended as a result of the alleged libel and no other.22 However, if a 
person demands a retraction within twenty days after he receives 
knowledge of a publication or broadcast of an alleged libel or slander 
and a retraction is not given, the complainant may recover general 
and special damages.23 Exemplary damages may be also recovered, if 
the plaintiff alleges and proves that the publication or broadcast was 
made with actual malice. This finding is within the discretion of the 
court or jury, and actual malice may not be presumed or inferred.24 
This section does not protect magazines.26 
Members of the media have a conditional privilege under Civil 
Code section 47 to make a true and fair report of a judicial, legisla-
tive or other official public proceeding and anything "said in such 
proceeding, or of a verified charge or complaint by any person to a 
public official, upon which complaint a warrant shall have been is-
sued."2s Civil Code section 47(5) provides an absolute privilege for 
the fair and true report of the proceedings of a lawful, public meet-
ing or the publication of the matter published "for the public bene-
fit."I'7 Additionally, under Civil Code section 47(3), the media may 
claim a conditional privilege for a defamatory publication if the com-
munication is made, without malice, to an interested person or to a 
person so related to such person as to "afford a reasonable ground 
for supposing the motive for the communication innocent" or who is 
requested by the person interested to give the information.1I8 This 
section does not protect newspapers and magazines however, when 
the publication was made merely because "it relates to a matter 
which may have general public interest."lIe 
Actions against California media are also limited by the Uni-
form Single Publication Act. This act precludes a person from bring-
ing more than 
one cause of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion 
of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication 
or exhibition or utterance, such as anyone issue of a newspaper 
or book or magaz~ne or anyone presentation to an audience or 
22. CAL. CIY. CODE § 48a(4)(b) (West 1982). 
23. CAL. CIY. CODE § 48a(l) (West 1982). 
24. CAL. CIY. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1982). 
25. Montandon v. Triangle Publications, 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 953, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 
195 (1975). 
26. CAL. CIY. CODE § 47(4) (West 1982). 
27. CAL. CIY. CODE § 47(5) (West 1982). 
28. CAL. CIY. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). 
29. Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Ct., Cty. of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 
664, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 358-59 (t 980). 
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anyone broadcast over radio or television or anyone exhibition 
of a motion picture. so 
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Under the Act, a "publication of an integrated issue of a mass media 
writing occurs upon the first general distribution of the material to 
the public."31 This date is set as the earliest date on which the alleg-
edly defamatory information is "substantially and effectively commu-
nicated to a meaningful mass of readers."32 
B. Libel 
The California codes include statutory provisions for both civil 
and criminal libel. Civil libel is defined as "a false and unprivileged 
publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed repre-
sentation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, 
or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation."33 Criminal 
libel is defined as: 
a malicious defamation, expressed either by writing, printing, or 
by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory 
of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, 
or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects of one 
who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, con-
tempt, or ridicule.S• 
Civil libel liability is imposed when a publication contains a 
false statement of fact3t! and is I:lnprivileged.38 If a newspaper is in-
volved, the publication must be examined in the context of the article 
in which it is included; the statement is not considered alone.3? In 
addition, the person defamed must be ascertainable from the publica-
tion, although the actual name of the person need not be published.38 
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3425.1 (West 1985). 
31. Strick v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 143 Cal. App. 3d 916, 922, 192 
Cal. Rptr. 314, 317 (1983). 
32. Id. (quoting Osmers v. Parade Publications, 234 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964)). 
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982). 
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 248 (West 1970). 
35. Gregory v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596,600,552 P.2d 425, 427,131 
Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1976). 
36. Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d 161, 217 P.2d 687, 691 (1950). 
37. JelTers v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 2d 717, 727-28, 328 P.2d 1030, 
1037 (1958), disapproved on other grnds., MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 
536, 551, 343 P.2d 36, 44 (1959). 
38. DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Federation of Labor & Congress of Indus. Or-
ganizations, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1963). 
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Malice must be shown to sustain a civil libel action.39 Malice is pre-
sumed when the publication is libelous per se.40 Libel on its face, or 
libel per se, is a "libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without 
the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innu-
endo or other extrinsic fact."41 Malice is never presumed unless the 
publication is actionable as libel per se.42 The falsity of the publica-
tion may be admissible as evidence of malice, but such evidence is 
not necessarily conclusive on this point.48 
A publication must be malicious to support an action for crimi-
nal libel. 44 Malice is presumed if no "justifiable motive" is shown for 
the publication.411 Criminal libel is punishable by imprisonment or 
fine. 48 The publication need not be read or seen by another to sup-
port a criminal libel charge.47 All that is required is that the "ac-
cused knowingly parted with the immediate custody of the libel 
under circumstances which exposed it to be read or seen by any 
other person than himself."48 However, the communication is privi-
leged and presumed not to be malicious if it is made to a person 
interested in the communication or if it is made by one who stood in 
such a relation to the person interested in the communication as to 
afford reasonable grounds to believe that his motive was innocent.49 
Truth is admissible as evidence in a criminal libel case, and the de-
fendant will be acquitted if the trier of fact finds that the matter 
charged as libelous is true and was published with good motives and 
for justifiable ends.GO 
C. Slander 
As with libel, California's slander law includes both criminal 
and civil statutes. Civil slander is defined as follows: 
39. Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 22 
Cal. 3d 672, 680, 586 P.2d 572, 575, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 261 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
961 (1979). 
40. Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 289, 38 P. 
903 (1894). 
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 1982). 
42. Lewis v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527, 533, 132 P. 1022, 1024 (1913). 
43. Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 217 P.2d at 692 (1950). 
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 248 (West 1970). 
45. CAl.. PENAL CODE § 250 (West 1970). 
46. CAl .. PENAL CODE § 249 (West 1970). 
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 252 (West 1970). 
48. Id. 
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 256 (West 1970). 
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 251 (West 1970). 
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Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, 
and also communications by radio or any such or other means 
which: 
1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, 
convicted or punished for crime; 
2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, conta-
gious or loathsome disease; 
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profes-
sion, trade or business, either by imputing to him general dis-
qualification in those respects which the office or other occupa-
tion peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with 
reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a 
natural tendency to lessen its profits; 
4. Imputes to him impotency or a want of chastity; 
5. Which, by natural consequences, causes actual damages. III 
Criminal slander is defined as follows: 
Slander is a malicious defamation, orally uttered whether or not 
it be communicated through or by radio or any mechanical or 
other means or device, whatsoever, tending to blacken the mem-
ory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, 
virtue or reputation, or disclose the actual or alleged defects of 
one who is living, or of any educational, literary, social, frater-
nal, benevolent or religious corporation, association or organiza-
tion, and thereby to expose him or it to public hatred or 
ridicule.1I1 
387 
Unlike the civil slander provIsion, the criminal provIsion requires 
that the person utter the slander "willfully and with malicious in-
tent. "113 A person found guilty under Penal Code section 258 is sub-
ject to fine and/or imprisonment. "Words uttered in the proper dis-
charge of an official duty, or in any legislative or judicial proceeding 
or in any other official proceeding authorized by law, shall be privi-
leged and ... never ... deemed a slander .... "64 
The utterance of a slanderous statement is presumed to be mali-
cious, unless the communication was made to an "interested person" 
or was made by someone who stands in such a relation to such inter-
ested person that reasonable grounds exist for believing the utterance 
is innocent. 1I11 As with libel, truth is admissible as evidence and the 
51. CAL CIV. CODE § 46 (West 1982). 
52. CAl •• PENAL CODE § 258 (West 1970). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. CAl.. PENAl. CODE § 259 (West 1970). 
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defendant is acquitted if it appears that the utterance was made with 
justifiable ends and nonmalicious motives.G6 
Whether a statement constitutes slander is determined in light 
of all of the circumstances that surround its publication.1I7 A slander-
ous statement must be made with malice, which means "actual or 
express malice, hatred or ill will . . . beyond normal feelings toward 
a wrongdoer."118 
Defamation by radio or television broadcast is also considered 
slander in California.IIB Furthermore, a cause of action for slander 
per se will lie when a 
false and unprivileged communication by radio which tends di-
rectly to injure a person "in respect to his office, profession, 
trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualifi-
cation in those respects which the office or other occupation pe-
culiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to 
his office, profession, trade or business that has a natural ten-
dency to lessen its profits. "80 
The radio broadcast should be considered in its entirety to determine 
whether or not the communication is slanderous.s1 California Civil 
Code section 48.5 precludes the imposition of liability upon the 
owner, licensee or operator of a television or radio broadcasting sta-
tion or agents or employees of such persons, for broadcast of slander-
ous statements by someone other than these persons.62 If someone 
other than these persons utters the slanderous remarks, that person 
alone is liable for any damages for any such defamatory statement.ss 
II. INv ASION OF PRIVACY 
The right of privacy is now protected by the California Consti-
tution.Sf Previously, only the common law recognized this right. 
California common law recognizes four kinds of invasions of 
privacy. They are: 1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli-
tude or into his private affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing 
private facts about the plaintiff; 3) publicity which places the plain-
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 260 (West 1970). 
57. Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal: App. 2d 955, 961, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392, 396 (1966). 
58. Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3!1 958, 969, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374 (1980). 
59. Arno, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 961, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 396. 
60. Correia v. Santos, 191 Cal. App. 2d 844, 850-51, 13 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (1961). 
61. Id. 
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.5 (West 1982). 
63. Id. 
64. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (West 1974). 
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tiff in a false light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation for the 
defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or likeness.e& 
Case law further clarifies the interpretation of each kind of in-
vasion of privacy. In order for a person to recover for "public dis-
closure of private facts, the disclosure must be public in the sense 
that it is communicated to the public in general, or to a large num-
ber of persons."ss The facts must be private, and not public knowl-
edge, and those facts made public must be such that would be "of-
fensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities."s7 In addition, the facts must be "an unwarranted pub-
lication of intimate details of one's private life which are outside the 
realm of legitimate public interest."ss 
If the defendant is a member of the media and the plaintiff is a 
public figure, the plaintiff must satisfy the requirement of actual 
malice, as enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan,s9 in order to 
recover for false light invasion of privacy. However, if the plaintiff is 
a private citizen, the standard for liability is "less than actual malice 
short of liability without fault."7o The standard for liability is higher 
in a false light action because this kind of privacy invasion is consid-
ered equivalent to defamation.71 
California has no statutory provisions for false light or "public 
disclosure of private facts;" however, Civil Code section 48(a)71 is 
applicable to a false light invasion of privacy claim if the defendant 
is a member of the media.78 
Common law liability for appropriation of a person's likeness 
or name requires: 1) the defendant to use the plaintiff's name or 
likeness to the defendant's advantage commercially or otherwise; 2) 
the lack of plaintiff's consent; and 3) a resulting injury.7. California 
65. Eastwood v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417, 198 
Cal. Rptr. 342,346 (1983); Stt also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 603 P. 
2d 425, 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323,326 (1979); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. 
App. 3d 825, 828,134 Cal. Rptr. 839,841, (1976); johnson v. Harcourt, Brace & jovanovich, 
43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 887, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 375 (1974). 
66. Porten, 64 Cal. 3d at 828, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841. 
67. Sipple v. The Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1045, 201 Cal. 
Rptr. 665, 667-68 (1984). 
68. Id. at 1047, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 669. 
69. 376 U.S. 254 (1966). 
70. Rastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 351. 
71. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 543, 483 P.2d 34, 44, 93 Cal. 
Rptr. 866, 876 (1971). 
72. CAl .. CIV. CODE § 48(a} (West 1982). 
73. johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, jovanovich, 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 893, 1\8 Cal. Rptr. 
370, 380 (1974). 
74. Rastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 437. 
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also has statutory provisions covering commercial appropriation in-
vasion of privacy.711 
In addition to the requirements set forth above, case law re-
quires that the defendant knowingly use the plaintiff's name, photo-
graph or likeness for the purpose of advertising or solicitation of 
purchases. Moreover, there must be a direct connection between the 
use and the commercial purpose.76 
No case law has interpreted Civil Code section 990, which was 
added in 1984. However, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,77 a pre-sec-
tion 990 case, involved a section 990 issue. The action was brought 
by Bela Lugosi's descendants. The court ruled that the action could 
not be maintained because the right to privacy was a personal right 
and did not survive Lugosi's death.78 Lugosi would probably have 
been decided differently under Civil Code section 990 because that 
section permits damages to be recovered for commercial appropria-
tion of a deceased person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness.79 
III. CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM 
California has not followed an emerging trend toward allowing 
all types of cameras in courtrooms during judicial proceedings. In 
1978, California Rules of Court rule 980 was enacted on an experi-
mental basis. The rule was permanently enacted in 1984.80 
Under Rule 980, members of the media are allowed to broad-
cast or record court proceedings only upon a written court order.81 
Media access to photograph, record, or broadcast court proceedings 
is available only at the absolute discretion of the trial judge.82 The 
trial judge has the power, in the interest of justice and to protect the 
rights of the parties, to refuse such media access to the courts.8a 
Rule 980 prohibits film or electronic media coverage of closed 
proceedings, in-chambers proceedings, and jury selection.84 Coverage 
of attorney-client conferences and bench conferences is also prohib-
75. CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1985). 
76. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417-18, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347; see also Johnson v. 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d at 895, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (1974). 
77. 25 Cal 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). 
78. Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329. 
79. CAL. CIY. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985). 
80. CAL. R. CT. 980 (1984). 
81. CAL. R. CT. 980(b) (1984). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. CAL. R. CT. 980(b)(2) (1984). 
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ited.811 Additionally, the court can restrict the type of equipment it 
will permit into the courtroom even after an order has been granted 
allowing media coverage.88 No film or electronic media coverage is 
permitted which is not included in the court's order.87 The key issue 
in the area of film and video coverage of courtroom proceedings is a 
proper balancing of the right of the press and public's right to know, 
against the right of the defendant to a fair trial, unfettered by poten-
tially prejudicial publicity.88 This issue arises both in regard to cam-
eras in the courtroom and when the media's general right of access to 
courtroom proceedings is challenged.89 
The courts have consistently restricted general media access to 
the courts on the theory that the press has no greater right of access 
than the general public.90 The media have no constitutional right of 
access to preliminary proceedings in California, such as voir dire and 
preliminary hearings.91 This is so despite California common law 
which assures a defendant a right to a public preliminary hearing.911 
This common law rule is specifically excepted by Penal Code 
section 868,98 which requires the preliminary examination to be 
open and public, but gives the defendant the right to request clo-
sure.9f Before closure is granted, Penal Code section 868 requires a 
magistrate to find that closure is necessary in order to protect the 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial tria1.911 
Moreover, case law has interpreted Penal Code section 868 to 
require an overriding interest supported by adequate findings that 
closure is necessary to preserve that interest98 before such closure is 
granted. 
Although the media is afforded a right of access under section 
868 and Rule 980, that access is severely restricted. The permanent 
85. [d. 
86. CAl .. R. CT. 980(b)(3) (1984). 
87. CAl .. R. CT. 980(d) (1984). 
88. San Jose Mercury News v. The Mun. Ct. for the Sunnyvale Cupertino Dist. of 
Santa Clara Cty., 30 Cal. 3d 498, 502-03, 638 P.2d 655, 657, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 774 (1982). 
89. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Diaz), 37 Cal. 3d 772, 691 P.2d 1026,209 
Cal. Rptr. 360, 366 (1984). 
90. San Jose Mercury News, 30 Cal. 3d at 503, 638 P.2d'at 655, 179 Cal. Rptr·. at 774. 
91. [d. at 508, 638 P.2d at 660-61, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 778. 
92. People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 524-26, 612 P.2d 941,943-45, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 851, 853-54 (1980). 
93. CAl .. P.:NAL CODE § 868 (West 1985). 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. See Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 772, 691 P.2d 1026, 209 
Cal. Rptr. 360 (1984). 
392 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
enactment of Rule 980 suggests that no change is likely in the near 
future regarding cameras in the courtroom, despite the trend in other 
states and the United States Supreme Court toward allowing elec-
tronic and film media access to courtrooms. The above-mentioned 
California statutes adamantly protect a defendant's right to a fair 
trial-even at the expense of public access through media coverage. 
IV. SHIELD LAW 
In 1980, the California Legislature amended the state constitu-
tion to grant the news media a qualified right to refuse to disclose 
their sources of information.97 Under this provision, a member of the 
news media can rarely be cited for contempt of court for failing to 
reveal a news source.98 This right was first codified in 1872 under 
Civil Code section 1881(b)99 and later was codified under current 
Evidence Code section 1070.100 
Both of these provisions seek to facilitate the free flow of infor-
mation as required by the first amendment freedom of the press.10l 
However, article 1, section 2 of the state constitution and Evidence 
Code section 1070 protect members of the news media only against 
contempt citations for failure to disclose sources of information. The 
provisions do not insulate the media from other court sanctions. 101 
The first amendment does not protect the press from criminal 
sanctions. loa Nor are members of the media privileged to identify 
court officers or those subject to court orders or the court's control.104 
However, members of the media are protected from revealing all 
other sources. loa 
The right to a fair trial may outweigh a press privilege against 
discovery.1oe In general, neither of these rights is superior to the 
other. When a conflict arises, however, each must be balanced 
97. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (1980). 
98. Id. 
99. CAL. CIY. PRoc. CODE § 1881(b) (West 1965), rtCodiJitd at CAL. EVID. CODE § 
1070 (West Supp. 1986). 
100 .. CAl .. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1985). 
lOt. CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251,149 
Cal. Rptr. 421, 427 (1978). 
102. Se, Rosato v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 427, Clrt. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1975). Set also Comment, Californw's "Ntw" Ntws-
men's Shield Law and the Criminal Defendant'S Right to a Fair Trial, 26 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 219 (1986). 
103. Id. at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446. 
104. Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450. 
105. Id. 
106. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 251-52, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427. 
1986] CALIFORNIA MEDIA 393 
against the other with the aim of mutual accommodation and mini-
mum interference"O'7 No privilege exists if the source at issue has 
already been exposed to the public. lo8 Additionally, no privilege ex-
ists to conceal a source demanded by court order.lo8 
Evidence Code section 1070 only applies to unpublished infor-
mation, which is "information not disseminated to the public by the 
person from whom disclosure is sought."llo In addition, the section 
only applies to news or news commentary given by a reporter who is 
a member of the television or radio news media.lll 
The statute does not explain what type of information is 
considered news. However, case law defines "news" as "a report 
of a recent event, intelligence, or information about some person 
or thing."1l2 Only truth qualifies as news.1l3 Neither case law, 
nor the statute explains why information received by personnel of 
magazines, newspapers, and other periodicals does not constitute 
news. 
V. PU,BLICATION OF PILFERED DOCUMENTS 
In the area of pilfered documents, two key questions are raised: 
1) whether the publication of pilfered documents involves receipt of 
stolen property by the publisher in addition to a possible invasion of 
privacy tort, and 2) whether there is an increased penalty for receipt 
of pilfered government documents and/or a presumption of theft or 
knowing receipt of these documents by the publisher. No statutory 
provisions directly address these issues; however, liability for inva-
sion of privacy and/or criminal penalties may be imposed upon a 
'person who pilfers either non-government or government documents. 
Additionally, a person unauthorized to receive these documents may 
be liable whether the documents were either pilfered or lawfully 
obtained. 
As mentioned above in Section II, Penal Code section 631 (a) 
sanctions could be imposed upon one who uses or attempts to use 
information obtained through illegal wiretapping. 114 This provision 
may be applicable to media members who attempt to, or who do 
publish or broadcast information obtained in this manner. Moreover, 
107. Jd. at 252, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427. 
108. Jd. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426. 
109. Jd. at 251, n.2, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426, n.2. 
110. CAl.. EVID. CODE § 1070(c) (West Supp. 1985). 
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(b) (West Supp. 1985). 
112. Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121,216 P.2d 825 (1950). 
113. Id. 
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a) (West 1985). 
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because Penal Code section 631 and the criminal invasion of privacy 
statutes do not appear to be limited to privacy invasions of private 
citizens, these provisions could likewise be used when government 
documents are unlawfully obtained. 
In addition, members of the media who make unauthorized and 
willful disclosure of the contents, or part of the contents of a tele-
graphic, or telephonic communication, may be punished under Penal 
Code section 637.116 Likewise, the unauthorized procurement or 
opening of mail addressed to another which contains a telegraphic or 
telephonic message, with the intent to use the contents thereof, is 
punishable,ue As mentioned previously, a similar civil action may be 
maintained under Penal Code section 637.2.117 
With regard to government documents, Penal Code section 
11143 makes a misdemeanor the receipt of criminal records or infor-
mation from such a record, by an unauthorized person. However, 
this statute specifically excepts persons protected by the media shield 
law or Evidence Code section 1070. In McCall v. Oroville Mercury 
CO.,118 the plaintiff argued that Penal Code section 11143 was appli-
cable to members of the media. In that case, a newspaper obtained 
from the Department of Justice and published the criminal record of 
an elected official. The plaintiff contended that the records were un-
lawfully obtained pursuant to section 11143. The court held that 
section 11143 exempted all members of the news media and not just 
those who were subject to contempt citations for failure to disclose 
sources of information. 119 
Case law in the area of publication of pilfered documents is 
scant when wiretapping, eavesdropping, or any other form of unau-
thorized taking is involved. However, People v. Kunkin120 addressed 
the question of whether the publication of stolen government docu-
ments necessarily subsumed the receipt of stolen property. The court 
held that sufficient evidence existed to show that the documents had 
been stolen, but not enough evidence was produced to infer that the 
publisher knew, or should have known that the documents were sto-
len.1Il Presumably, then, a publisher who knew or should have 
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637 (West 1985). 
116. CAL PENAL CODE § 637.1 (West 1985). 
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (West 1985). 
118. McCall v. Oroville Mercury Co., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 3d 80S, 191 Cal. Rptr. 280 
(1983). 
119. Id. at 808, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 283. 
120. People v. Kunkin, 9 Cal. 3d 245, 507 P.2d 1392, 107 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1973). 
121. Id. at 255·56. 
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known that the documents were stolen could be prosecuted for re-
ceipt of stolen goods under Kunkin.U2 An invasion of privacy issue 
was not raised in the case, but it may be assumed that such an action 
would lie when the publication of the document would invade the 
privacy of a person mentioned or referred to in the publication. 
VI. OPEN MEETING LEGISLATION 
California public policy dictates that state bodies, public agen-
cies and legislative bodies of local agencies must conduct their meet-
ings openly and in public so that the public can remain informed. us 
This is a requirement of the Bagley-Keene ActlS. as well as of the 
Brown Act.ulI 
These statutory provisions specifically exempt certain meetings. 
Section 11126 permits closed sessions in a number of situations, in-
cluding: meetings to consider appointment, employment or dismissal 
of public employees; examination of licenses; administrative adjudi-
cations; and consideration of national security issues.126 
Under the Bagley-Keene Act, a "state body" is defined as 
"every state board or commission, or similar multimember body of 
the state which is required by law to conduct official meetings and 
every commission created by executive order," not including, inter 
alia, meetings required to be open under the Brown Act and certain 
state agencies under California Constitution article VI.127 This defi-
nition includes "any board, commission, committee or any similar 
multimember body which exercises any authority of a state body del-
egated to it by that state body,"128 or "on which a member of a body 
which is a state body ... serves in his or her official representative 
capacity as a representative of such state body and which is sup-
ported, in whole or in part, by funds provided by the state body.1Il29 
The term "state body" also includes advisory bodies consisting of 
three or more persons (boards, committees, commissions, or subcom-
mittees) which are created by formal action of a state body or a 
member of the state body.180 
122. Id. 
123. CAl .. GOV'T CODE §§ 54953 (West 1983) & 11120 (West Supp. 1986). 
124. CAl .. Gov'T CODE §§ 11120-11130.7 (West 1981). 
125. CAl.. Gov'T CODE §§ 54950-54959 (West 1983). 
126. CAL GOV'T CODE § 11126 (West Supp. 1986). 
127. CAl.. GOV'T CODE § 11121 (West Supp. 1986). 
128. CAL GOV'T CODE § 11121.2 (West Supp. 1986). 
129. CAl.. Gov'T CODE § 11121.7 (West Supp. 1986). 
130. CAl .. GOV'T CODE § 11121.8 (West Supp. 1986). 
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Persons who attend meetings under the Bagley-Keene Act are 
not required to register their names or to fulfill any other conditions 
to attend such meetings. Attendance lists or other similar documents 
circulated during public meetings must indicate that signing the list 
or document is completely voluntary.lSl Meetings required to be 
public must be open to all persons who wish to attend.132 Also, the 
members of the public may request to be notified of a meeting at 
least ten days in advance,183 and the notice shall include an agenda 
of the meeting. ls4 Furthermore, when an emergency session is called, 
an agenda of that session is to be made available to the public.1311 A 
member of a state body who attends a meeting in violation of the 
Bagley-Keene Act, with knowledge that the meeting is held in viola-
tion of the Act, is guilty of a misdemeanor.13s 
The Brown Act permits closed sessions, when legislative bodies 
of local agencies meet with law enforcement officers to discuss possi-
ble threats to the security of, or access to, public buildings,137 and 
when license applications are issued. l3S The Act also permits the ex-
clusion, during the examination of a witness, of other witnesses in 
the same investigative matter. l39 
Like the Bagley-Keene Act, the Brown Act provides that a per-
son attending a public meeting is not required to meet any condi-
tions, such as registration, or completion of a questionnaire.140 Any 
person is allowed to tape the proceedings of an open and public ses-
sion, provided such action does not disrupt the meeting.l41 The legis-
lative body of a local agency is to provide in its by-laws or by resolu-
tion, a time and place for its regular meetings.H2 A notice of each 
regular meeting must be mailed, at least one week before such meet-
ing, to each person within the district who has filed a written request 
for such notice with the legislative body at issue. l43 Meetings may be 
continued by order or notice of continuance, provided that notice of 
131. c.u. GOV'T CODE § 11124 (West Supp. 1986). 
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11123 (West Supp. 1986). 
133. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11125(a) (West Supp. 1986). 
134. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11125(b) (West Supp. 1986). 
135. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11125(g) (West Supp. 1986). 
136. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11130.7 (West Supp. 1986). 
137. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54957 (West 1983). 
138. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54956.7 (West 1983). 
139. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54957 (West 1983). 
140. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54953.3 (West 1983). 
141. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54953.5 (West 1983). 
142. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54954 (West 1983). 
143. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54954.1 (West 1983). 
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such continuance is conspicuously posted. Iff 
The exceptions of the acts are to be narrowly construed, so as to 
favor disclosure and the intent of the Legislature to keep the public 
informed of the functions of governmental and public agencies.l4& 
In San Diego Union v. City Council of City of San Diego, a 
case involving the Brown Act, the court held that city council ses-
sions at which salaries of nonelected city officers or employees are 
discussed may be closed to the public.148 However, council sessions to 
discuss the amount of a salary increase for a specific individual must 
be open to the public.147 Minutes of a meeting held in violation of 
the Brown Act are subject to disclosure.148 
VII. OPEN RECORDS LEGISLATION 
The Public Records Act of 1968148 was enacted to curb govern-
mental secrecy and to ensure individual privacy.lllo The Legislative 
Open Records Act,161 and the Public Records Act declare that "ac-
cess to information concerning the conduct of the people's business 
by the Legislature is a fundamental and necessary right of every citi-
zen."11I2 As a result of California's policy favoring the disclosure of 
public records, the exceptions to the Public Records Act are to be 
narrowly construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent to 
curtail governmental secrecy.lIIS 
The primary issue under the Public Records Act is whether the 
records are "public records." "Public records," as defined by the 
statute, include "any writing containing information relating to the 
conduct of the public's ~usiness prepared, owned, used or retained by 
any state or local agency regardless of physical form or 
characteristics. "1114 
144. CAl.. GOV'T CODE § 54955.1 (West 1983). 
145. Register Div. of Freedom Newspaper v. Orllnge City, 158 Cal. App. 3d 893,907-
08,205 Cal. Rptr. 92, 100 (1984); San Diego Union v. City Council of City of San Diego, 
146 Cal. App. 3d 947, 955, 196 Cal. Rptr. 45,49 (1983). 
146. San Dugo Union, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 955, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 50. 
147. ld. at 956, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 50. 
148. Register Div. of Freedom Newspaper, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 907, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 
101. 
149. CAl.. Gov'T CODE §§ 6250-6626 (West 1983). 
150. Register Div. of Freedom Newspaper, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 902, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 
97; see also San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 766, 772, 192 Cal. 
Rplr. 415, 420 (t 983). 
151. CAl.. GOV'T CODE § 9070 (West 1980). 
152. CAl.. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250 (West 1983) & 9070 (West 1980). 
153. San Gabriel Tribune, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 426. 
154. CAl.. Gov'T CODE § 6252(d) (West 1983). 
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This definition, as further expanded by case law, covers "every 
conceivable kind of record that is involved in the governmental pro-
cess and will pertain to any new form of record keeping instrument 
as it is developed. Only purely personai information unrelated to the 
'conduct of the public's business' is exempt."I1111 
The Act specifies which agencies must provide written guide-
lines on the accessibility of such records,1118 which records are pub-
lic,1II7 and which records are exempted.1II8 
Even though the Public Records Act does not specifically cover 
court records, such records are considered public and are available 
for inspection by the public, including the news media, unless a spe-
cific exception exists for making such records non public. llle However, 
a court may not grant to the media a greater right of access to its 
records than it grants to the general public. The court can tempora-
rily restrict access to its records upon a showing of good cause.180 In 
re Estate of Hearst states, in dictum, that no unrestrained right of 
the news media to gather information exists merely because the news 
media has the right to publish such information. 181 
As under both the Brown Act and the Bagley-Keene Act, com-
peting interests must be balanced when disclosure is sought under 
the Public Records Act. The courts seek to balance the public's right 
of access to information against both the government's need to pre-
serve secrecy and the individual's right to privacy.182 A public official 
may withhold disclosure when the public interest in nondisclosure 
outweighs the public interest in disclosure.18s In each case, a court 
has the duty to weigh the benefits and costs of disclosure.184 
The Public Records Act is modeled after the Federal Freedom 
of Information ACt. 1811 However, the Federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act does not include a provision similar to the Public Records 
155. San Gabritl Tribune, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (quoting 58 
Op. AH'y Gen. 629, 633-34 (1975)). 
156. CAL. GOV'T CoDE § 6253 (West 1983). 
(\ 157. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6254.7, 6254.8 (West 1983). 
158. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West 1983). 
159. In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1977) 
(citing Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 220-22, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968)). 
160. Id. at 785, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 826. 
161. Id.; see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 17 (1965). 
162. CBS, Inc. v. Block, 160 Cal. App. 3d 866, 207 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1984), hearing 
granted, L.A. 32029, Jan. 17, 1985. 
163. Id. 
164. ld.; see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6255 (West 1983). 
165. 5 U .S.C. §552 (1977). 
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Act above, which requires a balancing of these interests.166 Govern-
ment code section 6255 provides a balancing test by which records 
that are not ordinarily exempt under the Public Records Act may be 
withheld from disclosure, if it is in the public interest to do SO.167 
Nondisclosure is in the public interest when the disclosure 
would expose an individual's personal or financial information/68 or 
state secrets,169 or information retained by governmental agencies.170 
Government Code section 6255 is based on California's common law 
rule that "public policy demands that certain records should not be 
open to indiscriminate public inspection, even if they are in the cus-
tody of a public official and even if they contain material of a public 
nature. "171 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The California Constitution has institutionalized the freedom of 
speech and of the press in article I, section 2(a). However, these first 
amendment guarantees are not absolute; they may be regulated.17ll 
When a person's exercise of first amendment rights infringes upon 
the rights of another, civil or criminal actions may lie to curtail, pre-
vent, or to punish such infringements.17s Accurate generalizations re-
garding the implementation of the above-stated policy are difficult, 
. but it appears that California's courts and Legislature tend to lean 
toward the protection of news media when the countervailing interest 
is primarily a governmental interest. Conversely, when the exercise 
of "media rights" would tend to infringe on individual rights, the 
policy of the state seems to favor the protection of the threatened 
individual rights. 174 
One issue which pervades the separate topics surveyed in this 
166. [d. 
167. CAL GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West 1983). 
168. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 6254(c), 6254(i) (West 1983). 
169. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(1) (West 1983). 
170. CAL GOV'T CODE § 6254(a) (West 1983); see CBS, Inc. v. Block, 160 Cal. App. 
3d 866, 207 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (1984). 
171. [d.; see also City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 156, 
238 P.2d 581 (1951). 
172. Horace Hosford v. California State Personnel Bd., 74 Cal. App. 3d 302, 306, 141 
Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (1977). 
173. People v. Young, 33 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 747, 85 P.2d 231 (1938), rro'd on other 
grnds., 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
174. This approach may partially explain California's position on the question of 
whether to allow cameras in the courtroom during judicial proceedings. On this issue, Califor-
nia's courts-often leaders of reform-have declined even to become followers of what appears 
to be a clear trend toward increased (and presumptive) media access. 
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article is likely to be a significant factor in the future development of 
these areas of the law. It is the question of whether the media are 
entitled to rights which are greater than those afforded to the general 
public. The issue is especially pertinent with regard to access. Any 
analysis of this issue must recall that the rights often referred to as 
belonging to the media or to the press, are in fact, rights also belong-
ing to the public. While often asserted as a reason for denying the 
news media greater access than that afforded the general public,176 
this fact is also the media's best argument for special protection and 
expanded access. California courts have, thus far, refused to accept 
this argument. However, there is reason to suspect that the United 
States Supreme Court will eventually grant the media greater right 
of access. 
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,176 the United States Supreme 
Court upheld exclusion of the press and public from a pre-trial 
hearing concerning the suppression of evidence in a criminal trial. In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the right to a 
public trial, as set forth in the sixth amendment, belongs to the ac-
cused, and, therefore, cannot be invoked by the press or by the pub-
lic.177 The Court acknowledged, but declined to answer, whether the 
first amendment, as applicable to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment,178 affords both public and the press the rights to attend 
criminal trials. 178 
However, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia ISO the 
Court distinguished Gannett as applicable only to pre-trial proceed-
ings, and held succinctly "that the right to attend criminal trials is 
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment."lSl Just as a me-
dia plaintiff institutionalized and vindicated a public right in Rich-
mond Newspapers, the media are uniquely situated to exercise cer-
tain first amendment rights traditionally belonging to the public. "As 
a practical matter ... the institutional press is the likely, and fit-
ting, chief beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the 
'agent' of interested citizens, and funnels information about trials to 
a large number of individuals."ls2 The Richmond Newspapers case 
175. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978). 
176. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
177. /d. at 383-84. 
178. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
179. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 393. 
180. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
181. Id. at 580 (footnote omitted). 
182. Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, j., concurring). 
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also preserved, (albeit in a footnote to a concurring opinion), the 
"conceptually separate, yet related, question ... whether the media 
should enjoy greater access rights than the general public."183 
If the media are to be effective surrogates for the public with 
regard to its access, the media must sometimes be treated differently 
from the public. 
If a television reporter is to convey . . . sights and sounds to 
those who cannot personally visit tal place, he must use cameras 
and sound equipment. In short, terms of access that are reason-
ably imposed on individual members of the public may, if they 
impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be un-
reasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to 
the general public what the visitors see. IB4 
"News media rights," although derivative, seem destined for in-
creasing institutionalization. This result seems likely, even in light of 
the current composition and apparent disposition of the United 
States Supreme Court, which seems to have rejected absolutist ap-
proaches to the first amendment in favor of an ad hoc balancing of 
interests. 
183. [d. 
184. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (Stewart, j., concurring). 
